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Private Justice and the Federal Bencht
LAUREN K. ROBEL*

INTRODUCTION
The political branches have recently taken a new and intense interest in
what federal judges do. Surprisingly, this interest has been focused not on the
outcomes of cases-traditionally the source of antagonism between the
political and the judicial branches-but on the procedures federal judges
employ to decide cases. The executive branch, under the guidance of former
Vice President Dan Quayle, issued a fifty-point Agenda for Civil Justice
Reform that attacks the current discovery system and promotes the use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).' And the Congress recently provoked
strong criticism from federal judges when it enacted the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 19902 to tell federal judges in detail how they should manage their
cases and to cast its vote for ADR.'
Although observers may doubt the sincerity of the complaints that drive
such efforts, or the basis for the claims that the federal court system is in
need of help,' these complaints and claims should be analyzed in context.

t © Copyright 1993 by Lauren K. Robel. All rights reserved.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. This
Essay is a revised version of The PrivatizationContinuum: Views from the Bench, a paper delivered at
the 1990 Meeting of the Law and Society Association. I would like to thank Alfred Aman, Ralph
Gaebler, Gilbert Merritt, Judith Resnik, Susan Robel, and Alex Tanford for helpful comments on that

paper.
I. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM INAMERICA

15 (regarding alternative dispute resolution), 16-19 (regarding discovery) (1991).
2. Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3. For a history of the controversy, see Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal
Courts, 7 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 115 (1991). Governmental hostility to a substantial role for the
federal courts has been shared by more than one Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Burger emphasized, throughout his tenure, the need for increased efficiency and decreased
jurisdiction, and Chief Justice Rehnquist has followed his lead. In his Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary,for instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist compared the federal court system to "a city in the and
West which is using every bit of its water resources to supply current needs. In that situation we must
conserve water, not think of building new subdivisions. We must also think of how to cut down on
present uses of water because we know that some new subdivisions will inevitably be built. This means
we must give serious attention to curtailing some federal jurisdiction." William H. Rehnquist, Chief
Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary,THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1, 2-3.
4. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244 (1992) (challenging empirical basis

for claims that legal system is to blame for economic problems). But see Gregory B. Butler and Brian
D. Miller, Fiddling While Rome Burns: A Response to Dr. Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251 (1992)
(defending the claims and the data which form their basis to a limited extent).
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The courts face a burgeoning industry in alternative dispute resolution,
including private judging, that threatens to siphon off many civil cases,
including those of litigants wealthy enough to afford it and who find the
possibility of avoiding public regulation or scrutiny attractive.' In the public
policy world of the 1990s, adjudication in public courts for the resolution of
disputes is pass6; the focus is on its alternatives.6
The attention of the political branches to the possibilities of providing
private alternatives to public courts is probably long overdue. "Privatization,"
the transfer of the provision of services from the public to the private sector,
was a favorite policy of both the Reagan and Bush administrations.7 For
administrations committed ideologically, or at least rhetorically, to reducing
the size of government, privatization is an attractive choice because it
promises to bring the discipline and efficiency of the market to the provision
of government services. However, the decision to move a service traditionally
performed by the government to a private provider is a complex one that
requires, among other things, balancing the needs of public accountability and
cost efficiency '
As public policy, the movement of services from the public to the private
sector is often offered as a solution to the per'ceived inefficiencies of
government services. 9 Because government services are not offered to
individuals at their true cost, the argument goes, individuals consume too
much of them. The lack of market competition in the provision of services,
and the resulting inflated demand by consumers, leads to negative results,
among which are delay and excessive cost in the provision of the services. In
theory, moving government services into the private market will increase
efficiency and reduce overall cost by enhancing competition.

5. See, e.g., Gail D. Cox, Innovation-OrJust Court Triage?, NAT'L LAW J., Oct. 5, 1992, at 1,
10 (noting that private judging in California handled 10,000 cases in 1991); Bryant G. Garth,
Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary
Assessment, 12B STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 367, 384 (1992) (describing the history of commercial
arbitration as an "escape from regulation").
6. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 23-34 (describing ADR alternatives to cases being tried in federal courts); see also
Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
7. JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 1 (1989);

George L. Priest, Introduction: The Aims of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1988).
8. DONAHUE, supra note 7, at 11.
9. Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization,6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 6, 21-22 (1988); Priest,
supra note 7, at 1.
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Recent years have seen a renewal of the claim that the federal courts are in
a caseload crisis.' ° During the 1980s, a period of serious federal interest in
privatization, the claim of caseload crisis has typified most of the significant
discussions surrounding the problems of the federal courts.
If we compare the public policy reasons typically advanced for privatization
with the problems that are typically advanced as symptomatic of the federal
court caseload crisis, we can note some striking similarities. As the argument
runs, the problem with the courts is that they are overwhelmed by cases, far
beyond the capacity of the system to provide timely justice to individual
litigants." At least one federal appellate judge has suggested that the reason
for this crisis is that judicial services in those courts are offered to consumers

at far below their true cost; consumers (litigants) therefore consume3 too much
of these services.

2

The result has been delay and excessive cost.'

Given the similarities in the discourses and the popularity of privatization
policies, one might expect privatization of judicial services to be offered as
a solution to the federal caseload crisis and, in fact, there is a growing
industry in such services. To the extent that the "dispute-resolving" functions
of government have been transferred to private providers, the movement has

been prompted, until recently, by consumers' demands for alternatives, not by
government initiatives."4 However, as noted above, this consumer-driven
privatization has recently been augmented by an increased governmental

10. See, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-94
(1985), and the sources cited therein. The crisis has been going on for some time. See, e.g., Robert H.
Bork, Dealingwith the Overload in Article III Courts, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 150 (A. Leo Levin & Russell I Wheeler eds., 1979).
11. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMInrEE 4 (1990).

12. POSNER, supra note 10, at 7-8.
13. See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL. REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN

CIVIL LITIGATION (1989).
14. See, e.g., Gary Spencer, New York Lawyers Gatherfor Annual Meeting, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 10,
1992, at I I ("IT]here seemed to be a dawning awareness that the judicial system could not be counted
on to handle the civil caseload in either the short or long run. A number of programs and speeches were
devoted to the question: 'What next?' The most common answer was, 'Pnvate justice."'); see also
Garth, supra note 5.
The governmental response to ADR, at least on the federal level, has been until recently quite
cautious. In 1988, Congress authorized 20 federal district courts to experiment with "court-annexed"
arbitration in particular kinds of cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988). This statute limits the kinds of cases
that may be referred to arbitration without the consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 652(b) (permitting
referral of civil cases where only money damages are sought and damages are not in excess of
$100,000). For a description of some of these programs, see E. ALLAN LIND & JOHN SHAPARD,
EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION INTHREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial
Ctr. ed., 1983); Robel, supra note 6, at 24-25.
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interest in providing alternatives to litigation in the public court system.' 5
Thus, it might be thought that we are poised at the edge of serious privatization efforts in the federal courts. Yet, an observer focused on the traditional
indicia of privatization will miss an important trend already occurring in the
federal courts, and one to which the term "privatization" might apply
This Essay sketches several arguments. It argues that, with respect to courts,
privatization may be viewed as a continuum, a series of points between purely
private dispute resolution on the one hand and public adjudication on the
other. To the extent that courts abandon procedures that provide public access
and general accountability, they come to resemble their private alternatives.
Under the definition of privatization developed below, federal courts are
already substantially "privatized." Moreover, the push for privatization has
come from within the courts themselves, prompted by caseload pressures that
the judges view as in conflict with their professional standards. To the extent
that judges believe that an increased caseload creates a tension between
professional roles that value craft and skill and public roles that favor
visibility of process, these judges appear to be choosing strategies for
resolving that tension in favor of their professional roles.
Moreover, alternatives to public courts-notably private judges and the
proliferation of alternative dispute resolution providers-are threatening public
judges' place in dispute resolution. Judges' previous reactions to caseload
pressures suggest that they will respond to this threat by decreasing the
availability of public processes even further in order to compete effectively
for the cases that define their professional roles. To talk about this trend in
terms of "privatized process" is not simply to seize a convenient metaphor for
diminished accountability; rather, it is to recognize the synergistic relationship
between the burgeoning market of private
justice providers and the existence
6
of public procedures in the courts.'
Today's federal judge may well wonder what her job will look like in the
future. In addition to the exhortations of the political branches, there are
pressures from a variety of directions that promise to change the mix of cases,
the working conditions, and perhaps the very nature of federal judges' jobs.
Judges' incentive structures need to be understood by those concerned with
public policy What do federal judges cherish about their jobs? How will these

15. In addition to the examples at the beginning of this Essay, one can trace the interest in federal
ADR to members of Congress by the legislation they introduced through the 1980s. For an interesting
collection, see ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1988).
16. To this extent, then, I disagree with Paul Starr that the reallocation of resources within a public
agency cannot be called "pnvatlzation." Starr, supra note 9, at 14.
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changes affect the men and women who sit on the federal bench? How do
they perceive their roles? What satisfactions do judges receive from theirjobs,
and how will these changes affect those satisfactions? How will judges
attempt to protect the things they cherish from encroachment?
This Essay will attempt to show that these questions are worth consideration
as we embark upon serious privatization efforts in the courts. In beginning to
sketch some answers, I focus on the ways in which judges are like other
professions in the nonmonetary rewards they get from their work. In doing so,
it is not my'intention to disparage the commitment with which federal judges
approach public service, or the dedication they show to their work under often
difficult circumstances. I have the highest regard for both. Rather, my hope
is to emphasize how little we have thought about the central actors as we
discuss major revisions in their role.
I. THE PRIVATIZATION CONTINUUM
Discussions of the privatization movement's implications for courts might
see courts and private dispute resolution providers as sharply distinguished:
courts exist for "public" resolution of disputes, in contrast to the myriad
"4private" ways in which disputes are resolved. However, the designations
"6private" or "public" can represent a series of attributes associated with kinds
of dispute resolution, rather than the location of dispute resolution in either
state-operated courts or the offices of private providers. What attributes make
the resolution of a dispute "public"'9 The most obvious is the presence of the
coercive power of the state. But the list might include other things: hearings
open to the public, impartial and unbiased decision makers, rationalized
decision making, and accountability of decision makers enhanced through the
visibility of the decision-making process and the public announcement of the
decision. In fact, many people define "courts" as those institutions, and only
those institutions, that involve all of these attributes: (1)the coercive power
of state, (2) applied definitively to issue judgment, (3) in visible, unbiased,
accountable, rationalized ways. Thus, under some understandings of the
function of courts, their very purpose is the dissemination of public values,
a purpose to which private market alternatives seem intuitively ill-suited.' 7
The list of attributes mentioned above figures largely in discussions of the
legitimacy of the exercise of state power. These attributes are themselves
definitional: they traditionally define judges roles. Courts are public in another

17. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE
L. & POL'Y REv.42,57 (1988); Owen M. Fiss, Comment, AgainstSettlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081
(1984).
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definitional sense: they are instruments of government power."s Speaking of
"privatized" courts, then, may appear incoherent, for how can an arm of
government exercise anything but public power?
If one begins to define the content of "public" or "private" as it relates to
dispute resolution, it becomes apparent that it is possible to talk about
privatization not as a dichotomy but as a continuum. Courts move towards
privatization when their work becomes less visible, less accountable, less
rationalized, or when the work of judges ends, not in the issuance of the
state's judgment, but in the agreement of the parties to withdraw the lawsuit
or to submit to private ordering of the dispute. 9
As a description of the federal courts, the list of "public" attributes fails:
federal courts are involved in a variety of practices that do not include all (or
even any) of the attributes of public decision making listed above.2" Trial
judges seek to remove disputes from the public sphere by actively encouraging settlements and by diverting cases to court-annexed arbitration, mediation,
and "early neutral evaluation."'" Public appellate process is available for
only a small percentage of appellate litigants. Public hearings, rationalized
decision making, and public accountability through the publication of opinions
are becoming less frequent.22
II. PRIVATIZATION POLICY AND JUDGES' ROLES
Serious efforts to divert cases from traditional adjudicative processes have
thus far centered on the trial courts, rather than the appellate courts.23 As
public policy favoring alternatives to dispute resolution develops, it must
account for the effects such efforts will have on the public court system. Most
policy discussion has focused on what appear to be obvious benefits to a
system of decreased reliance on adjudicative processes: the claimed reductions

18. Robert Cover, as usual, explains this point best. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). As Paul Starr notes, "private" originally signified "not holding public office or
official position." Starr, supra note 9, at 8.
19. For instance, Starr describes the public sphere as "the open and visible" in contrast to the
private sphere that is "more closed, more shielded from contact and view." Starr, supra note 9, at 8
(private sphere), 9 (public sphere). The public sphere "also may be conceived of as that which applies
to the whole people," as a judgment belongs to the "whole people" rather than to the parties only. Id.
at 9.
20. Robel, supra note 6, at 37-57 (describing the variety of practices).
21. See Dons M. Provine, Justice a la Carte: On the Privatizationof Dispute Resolution, 12A
STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 345 (1992).
22. Robel, supra note 6, at 37-57.
23. But see LARRY C. FARMER, APPEALS EXPEDITING SYSTEMS: AN EVALUATION OF SECOND AND
EIGHTH CIRCUIT PROCEDURES (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1981).
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in consumer cost and delay, reduced public cost, and an easing of caseload
pressures.24 However, I would like to focus this discussion elsewhere.
Particularly, I would like to ask what we know about how public judges will
adapt to changes in their environment that threaten their abilities to perform
their professional roles.
Before engaging in this exercise, however, I would like to argue its
necessity Failure to account for public judges' reactions to shifts in their
workload will result in one of at least two anticipated reactions. First, to the
extent that judges can reallocate cases within the judicial bureaucracy to
parajudicial personnel such as clerks or magistrates, they have the ability and
the incentive to shift work to others in order to concentrate on (and compete
for) the kinds of cases they find professionally rewarding. This kind of
allocation has occurred at the appellate level in response to the caseload
crisis. While such shifts may or may not be benign, they raise a number of
policy questions in their own right. For instance, we may be concerned about
the quality or quantity of judicial attention cases receive. Second, as federal
judges no longer have the ability to fulfill their professional aspirations on the
bench, there is an obvious danger that they will leave in pursuit of more
rewarding work.25 As a society, we may not care. We may believe that large
numbers of qualified people will always find the prestige of the federal
judiciary attractive enough to insure that society's need for federal judges is
met; or we may not be in sympathy with the current professional aspirations
of federal judges, and wish to encourage a bench with different aspirations.
My point, however, is that the relationship between increased privatization
and the public courts is necessarily synergistic. The public bench will not
simply continue to do what it has always done if the environment surrounding
it is significantly altered.

24. For typical arguments with respect to cost and delay, see THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra
note 13. I have argued elsewhere that empirical claims for reliance on ADR are largely unsubstantiated.
See Robel, supra note 6, at 28-34. Proponents of ADR have also argued that consumers are more
satisfied with less adversarial resolutions of disputes. For a study on this point, see E. ALLAN LIND &
ROBERT J. MACCOUN, THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURTANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice ed.,

1989).
25. See Mark Thompson, Rented Justice, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1988, at 42 (noting that over 150
California judges had "gone Private," lured by the growing demand and good pay).
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A. The Appellate Analogy
1. Appellate Privatization
Appellate decision making is publicly accessible through oral arguments in
open court 6 and the publicly distributed written decisions of appellate
judges. 2' To the extent federal appellate courts decide cases without
argument, written and disseminated opinions, and judge involvement, they
move towards a less visible and accountable process-a privatized process.28
In federal appellate courts, the practice of privatization is well advanced.
The number of oral arguments heard in federal appellate court is alarmingly
low Fewer than half the circuits hear argument in even half the cases they
decide on the merits.29 Similarly, the publication rates are decreasing yearly,
with only a minority of federal circuits publishing even half of their
decisions.3" Moreover, in survey responses to the Federal Courts Study
Committee, judges admitted that they relied on their clerks and staff attorneys
to do things that they believed they should do themselves, particularly opinion
drafting.3
26. Oral argument serves many functions. Most obviously, it provides a way for judges to become
informed about the issues raised on appeal. Judges
also rely on oral argument to demonstrate to the parties that the members of a panel have
attended to the issues raised on appeal, to permit interaction with members of the bar, to
provide a forum for the presentation of issues of public concern, to acknowledge the court's
responsibility for resolving such disputes, and to provide an opportunity for the judges to
confer and hear each other's views.
JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: A DESCRIPTION OF
PROCEDURES INTHE COURTS OF APPEALS 159-60 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1985).
27. Nonpublication reduces judicial accountability. It makes evaluation of judges' work more
difficult. When coupled, as it often is, with denial of argument, it can render the appellate process
virtually invisible. Rules allowing decision without published opinion were adopted by all the circuits
in the mid-1970s, again in response to caseload. See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable
Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87
MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989).
28. Commentators have called this process bureaucratization, a characterization with which I have
no disagreement. See, e.g., Wade H. McCree, Jr., BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 777 (1981); see also POSNER, supra note 10, at 115-19. Privatization is a politically loaded
term, and in the appellate context, as opposed to the trial context, I find its helpfulness largely
metaphorical.
29. Robe], supra note 6, at 48. Not only is argument less frequent today than previously, it is
shorter when it occurs: some courts routinely allow cases only ten or fifteen minutes of argument per
side. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 16-17 (1976).
30. Robel, supra note 6, at 49-50. As of 1986, only three federal appellate courts published half of
their decisions on the merits. Id. at app. table 4.
31. Id. at 44-47.
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Why have courts moved to less public and arguably less accountable forms
of decision making? Caseload pressures are the engine for court privatization
in the sense just described.52 However, in most discussions of increased
caseload in the federal courts, not all cases are created equal. In order to
understand why, one must look more closely at both the content of and the
participants in the caseload crisis debates.

2. Privatization and Prestige
The major participants in caseload crisis discussions with respect to the
federal courts are federal judges and elite practitioners. As a group, they are
involved most heavily in legal work which is ordinarily business oriented and
is viewed generally by the bar as constituting the most prestigious areas of
practice. 33 Given what we know about how lawyers view the prestige of
various kinds of legal work, we could predict fairly easily that these caseload
critics would have strong views about the causes of the caseload crisis.
Particularly, we could predict that high-prestige cases, which congregate in
the area of business disputes, would not be identified as a caseload "problem"
whereas low-prestige cases, which congregate in the area of disputes involving
individual litigants, would be viewed as problematic.
In fact, these critics do not view "caseload" as an undifferentiated pile of
cases, all of which contribute equally to the crisis. Rather, they blame the
crisis on the proliferation of cases involving individual litigants attempting to
enforce public norms. Judge Posner writes, for instance, that the causes of the
caseload crisis include the increase in federal rights. He cites several
examples: "the increased number of federal rights that a federal prisoner can
assert in a post-conviction proceeding"; 34 the "greater number of federal
rights that state prisoners, whether challenging their convictions in habeas
corpus proceedings or challenging the conditions of their confinement in civil
rights proceedings"; 3 the "great increase in civil rights cases [that] must also

32. Id. at 38-56.
33. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0.

LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE

BAR 90-115 (1982) (discussing lawyers' allocation of prestige among different kinds of legal work). The
Heinz and Laumann study noted that consistent understandings of the prestige of various kinds of legal
work correlated strongly with the wealth of the client. The most prestigious kinds of work were
securities, tax, antitrust, patent, banking, public utilities, general corporate, probate, and municipal law.
Work ranked least prestigious included civil rights, criminal (prosecution), general family, cnrminal
(defense), consumer (creditor), personal injury, consumer (debtor), condemnation, landlord-tenant,
divorce, and poverty law. Id. at 91.
34. POSNER, supra note 10, at 81-82.
35. Id. at 82-83.
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be a product in large part of new law"; 3 6 and the "tremendous increase in the
number of cases under the social security laws. 37 At the same time, cases
by individual litigants asserting these federal rights are often cited as evidence
of the "trivialization" of the federal courts.38
Given the professional standing of the participants in the debate, it is hardly
surprising that they do not view the (increasingly) large number of cases
generated by business disputes as problematic, 39 but rather decry the
presence of large numbers of low-prestige, low-stakes cases involving
individual litigants.4"
At least at the appellate level, the cases that are being diverted to privatized
processes are overwhelmingly those that were identified above as the "causes"
of the crisis. Reductions in oral argument are not randomly distributed across
case types, but concentrate in cases involving individual, rather than business,
litigants. In 1986, for instance, while argument occurred in 77% of cases
involving antitrust or securities, and 69% of the contract actions, it occurred
in only 54% of the civil rights cases, 40% of social security claims, and 33%
of prisoner petitions.4'
Nonpublication is similarly concentrated in those cases that involve
individual litigants. In 1984, for example, 56% of employment civil rights
cases, 78% of social security cases, 63% of habeas corpus cases, and 78% of
prisoner civil rights cases were decided without published opinion. Only 26%
of antitrust cases, by comparison, were decided without published opinion.42
Moreover, in six circuits, a quarter of all cases are decided with neither oral
argument nor a published opinion.43 These cases again cluster in areas
involving individual litigants: 55% of immigration cases, 48% of social

36. Id. at 83.
37. Id. While I use Judge Posner as my example, others abound. See also Marc Galanter, The Life
and Times of the Big Six; Or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 921
(noting the growth of business disputes); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining
Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as
Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 719 (1988) (noting that there are fewer constitutional tort cases than
portrayed in public discussion).
38. Galanter notes then-Judge Scalia's lament that in the old days, the federal courts were the site
of "big, exotic, significant cases" and now are overrun with trivial ones. Galanter, supra note 37, at 92122.
39. For example, the area of contracts "has not only escaped condemnation, but has rarely if ever
been mentioned as the source of burgeoning caseloads. Yet upon inspection, it may be the most
spectacular area of growth in federal cases." Id. at 942.
40. The cases listed by Judge Posner, for instance, fall almost entirely at the bottom of Heinz and
Laumann's professional prestige rankings. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 33, at 91.
41. Robel, supra note 6, at app. table 2.
42. Id. at app. table 5.
43. Id. at app. table 3.
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security cases, and 68% of prisoner civil rights cases were decided in this
manner." By comparison, only 7% of antitrust claims and 14% of securities
cases were decided with neither argument nor published decision.4 5
Finally, it appears that judges' involvement in these non-argued, nonpublished cases is marginal. Senior staff attorneys in seven of the circuits
estimated that, in addition to motions, prisoners' petitions, and other pro se
litigation, their offices processed more than 75% of the fully counseled, nonargued cases that were decided on the merits in their circuits." In ten of the
circuits, staff attorneys present the cases to judges with memoranda or
proposed opinions, or both, attached. In only two of the circuits do the judges
regularly meet with staff attorneys to discuss the cases.47 Thus, central staff
attorneys have significant responsibility in a very large number of these
appellate cases.
Along with whatever gains in efficiency are produced by privatization at the
appellate level, it additionally serves the function of allowing appellate judges
to cabin their energies for the high-stakes, prestigious cases through which
judicial reputations are made. Like most of us, judges are likely to resist
developments that threaten to undermine their professional standing.
3. The Craft of Judging
While appellate judges strongly support public processes in theory,48 their
survey responses indicate that they overwhelmingly support the current
procedural arrangements in their courts-including low argument and
publication rates and high staff involvement.4 9 Social scientists have long
been interested in judges' conceptions of their roles as a way of understanding

44. Id. at app. table 5.
45. Id.
46. Office of Planning and Evaluation of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Report on the Survey of the Staff Attorneys' Offices of the United States Courts of Appeals 27 (1989)
(unpublished draft report on file with author); see also DONNA STIENSTRA & JOE S. CECIL, THE ROLE

(Federal
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1989) (describing non-argument decision-making procedures of the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit).
47. STiENSTRA & CECIL, supra note 46, at I-2.
48. For instance, in response to the surveys, most of the judges (87%) agreed that oral argument
was usually or often helpful; and most agreed that further reducing opinion publication would be
undesirable as a response to increased caseload. Robel, supra note 6, at 54-55.
49. Despite low argument rates, few judges believe that they forego argument in cases that could
benefit from it. Robel, supra note 6, at 54 n.214. Over 90% believed that oral argument times in their
courts were either about right or too long. Id. at 54 n.213. While less sure about publication than
argument, a majority of the judges believe that they publish as often as necessary and spend appropriate
amounts of time on opinion writing. Id. at 55 nn.215-16.
OF STAFF ATrORNEYS IN FACE-TO-FACE CONFERENCING IN NON-ARGUMENT DECISIONMAKING
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how judges reach decisions in discrete cases. But judges' conceptions of their
roles may also help explain why judges seem to support privatized process in
such numbers.
Woodford Howard's study of the federal appellate courts, for instance,
found that judges' role orientations were strongly professional, much more
professional, in fact, than political.50 Because judges' primary reference
groups are professional-party litigants and members of the bar-and because
judges take quite seriously the opinions of other judges, Howard notes that
judges consider each other their "severest critics."'" Additionally, he found
it striking that "the immediate participants in adjudication-colleagues,
counsel, clerks, litigants-were viewed as more influential touchstones and
targets of judging than the external interests emphasized in political or realist
theories of judicial decision."5 2
Judges' professional standing is based in large part on craft notions:
"Judicial prestige
turn[s] less on institutional than on individual
reputations for sound judgment and craftsmanship. 5 3 Reputations for sound
judgment and craftsmanship, in turn, rest on careful pre-argument preparation
and the production of thoughtful and intellectually satisfying opinions.
While judges have visions of their roles that are strongly tied to traditional
notions of craft and professional competence, there are other vantage points
for describing the role of the judge. In the United States, formal and informal
descriptions of judicial roles are tied to public definitions of the courts.
Judges exercise public power that is described by statute, by codes of ethics,
and by common understanding. Moreover, these descriptions of the role of the
judge have no "private" component: judges are, in some senses, such public
beings that even their private activities are extensively regulated in the
interest of maintaining the appearance of the integrity of their public role. 4
Judges' notions of the legitimacy of their exercise of power might be tied
to understandings of their public role. Thus, to the extent there is deviation
in practice from the "public" role, judges might be engaged in activities for
which there is a definitional problem that raises questions of legitimacy for
the judges. Moreover, these two aspects of the judicial role, the "pure"

50. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY
OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 150-51 (1981).
51. Id. at 150.
52. Id. at 151.
53. Id. at 144.
54. For instance, the Model Code of JudicialConduct, Canon 4, requires judges to regulate "extrajudicial activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with [their] judicial obligations," and Canon 2 states
that judges "should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all [their] activities." MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
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professional and the public, might be expected to collide if caseload pressures
are significant, as appellate judges report they are.55
Appellate judges' responses to open-ended survey questions about the effect
of caseload on their lives indicate that judges view caseload pressures as a
significant threat to the professional values of their craft.5 6 Over half of the
judges responding to this question 7 mentioned concerns about the deteriora-

tion of professional standards, and the loss of time for careful opinion
crafting, reflection on intellectual issues, or preparation for argument. Threats
to the more public aspects of their work, such as accountability and visibility,
were mentioned only eleven times, while the personal effects of increased
caseload, such as stress, anxiety, and increased working hours, were
mentioned forty times. 58 The legitimacy of judges' exercise of power under
conditions of reduced visibility and accountability surfaced in some of the
judges' comments.59 Rarely, however, did such concerns appear divorced
from concerns over the decline in professional standards. 6"

55. In fact, most of the survey respondents (81%) report that the workload is "overwhelming" or
"heavy." Robel, supra note 6, at 38.
56. The question was, "Please provide any additional information concerning the effects-if any-of
caseload pressures on how you do your work. Are there areas not mentioned [in the survey] that are
affected by caseload? Has collegiality on your court been affected? Have your work habits or working
hours changed? If so, how?" Survey of the United States Circuit Judges, Question 7, at 4 (Sept. 1989),
in 2 WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (Federal Courts Study Comm. ed., 1990). Half
of the judges (84) took this opportunity to write narratives. Survey Responses, Survey of the United
States Circuit Judges (Sept. 1989) (unpublished survey responses on file with author) (The author was
a consultant to the Federal Courts Study Committee and participated in constructing this survey).
57. Forty-seven of the judges surveyed mentioned these concerns. Survey Responses, supra note
56.
58. Answers were coded as "professional" if they mentioned the quality of opinion or oral argument
preparation, lack of time for reading opinions of other panels, other reading in the law, other "law
development" activities (such as commenting on the opinions of other judges), or lack of "thinking and
reflecting" time. Answers were coded as "public" if they mentioned the necessity of delegating judicial
work to clerks or central staff, reduction of oral argument, or the reduction of publication or opinion
writing. Answers were coded as "personal" if they mentioned increased hours, anxiety, stress, effects
on family, or lack of time for nonjudicial activities, like vacations or nonprofessional reading. Individual
responses could be coded in more than one category. Id.
59. Id.
60. This comment from the Sixth Circuit was typical:
Caseload increase has caused: (1) greatly increased bureaucracy, (2) decline in
responsibility of judge for decision in the case and delegation of that responsibility to
others-clerks and staff, (3) decline in conferences with other judges about case because
of press of time, (4) decline in collegiality because of increase in numbers and press of
time, (5) increase in sloppy and ill-considered opinions and intracircuit conflict because
of press of time.
Id. A different judge expressed a similar dissatisfaction with the overwhelming caseload:
I am often left with the nagging feeling that we are merely processing cases rather than
deciding them on the basis of collective thought after an adequate opportunity to consider
them. I sometimes feel that we are becoming captives of our staff-that we are being
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One of the hallmarks of professionalization is the extent to which the
"financial rewards of a job play second fiddle to psychic satisfactions."'" The
Federal Courts Study Committee's survey was conducted during a time when
Congress had been waffling on pay for federal judges, and many of the judges
who responded expressed some bitterness over their treatment on this issue.62
Responses to the appellate survey clearly demonstrate that judges feel
overworked and underpaid. Their sense of job satisfaction comes mainly from
the professional satisfaction and prestige they garner from their positions. To
the extent that judges believe that caseload creates a tension between
professional roles that value craft and skill, and thus enhance their prestige,
and public roles that favor visibility of process, these judges appear to be
choosing strategies for resolving that tension in favor of professional roles.
Statistics on the allocation of judicial appellate resources suggest that judges
have done so by choosing to protect professional values of craft in the cases
on which professional reputations are made, reserving public process for the
high-status cases involving elite litigants.
Howard notes that "the sway of traditional professional ideologies of the
judicial function seems unaffected by contrary experience, 63 and suggests
that disjunctions between theory and practice in appellate courts may represent
"'role lag'-that is, resistance in theory to changing appellate functions in
practice. 64 While Howard was speaking of attitudes towards decision
making, his comment seems applicable to judges' acceptance of privatized
process as the price for maintaining a sense of professional satisfaction. In the
face of societal decisions to expand federal rights, judges hold fast to craft
notions of quality--but only for those few elite cases.65

subsumed as functionaries in the appellate process, rather than performing as decision
makers and as originators of opinions.
Id.
61. HOWARD, supra note 50, at 118.
62. This comment was typical:
You didn't ask but the biggest problem we have is salary. The top lawyers simply have
no interest in our jobs. You cannot educate your children, take any meaningful trips or
pay normal living expenses. Congress has taken away most of our prestige by making us
"the laughing stock" of the legal community. Our country will ultimately "pay" a heavy
price. I work all the time. Read bnefs on airplanes, in the car on tnps, and during
vacations. Never get to read for pleasure and find it extremely difficult to engage in any
recreation.
Survey Results, supra note 56.
63. HOWARD, supra note 50, at 153.
64. Id.
65. I want to be clear that I am not passing judgment on this choice, nor am I arguing that all
judges have made it. Appellate judges are no more monolithic a group than the rest of us.
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B. Lessons for the Trial Courts
I want to speculate about what we might learn from the appellate experience
in the context of trial courts. First, it is clear that if the policies favoring
increased privatization within and without the trial courts succeed, the result
will be a dramatic change in the kinds of work federal trial judges do.
Whether these policies are instigated by elite litigants with the money to buy
the services of private judges, or by the Congress in setting up ADR attached
in some way to the federal courthouse, the point is to divert cases away from
adjudicative processes, and especially from judges. 66 Further, at least for
now, the kinds of cases that are being diverted are all civil. Federal judges in
the busiest federal districts complain that they are unable to try anything but
criminal cases. This suggests that a wholly criminal docket would be
unacceptable for most current judges.
If the appellate experience teaches anything, it is that if the environment in
which judges work begins to seriously threaten things that judges view as
central to their role, or to erode the prestige of their position, judges will
resist by changing their behavior. Further, the appellate experience gives
examples of ways in which judges might do this. In order to preserve their
ability to compete for the cases that they find intellectually and professionally
satisfying, judges may divert cases to others within the judicial bureaucracy
(most likely the magistrate judges).67
The work of federal trial courts is much more complex than that of
appellate courts. But if we confine our inquiry for the moment to issues of
prestige and professional satisfaction, we can begin to develop some concerns.
As members of a bar with a fairly unified vision of the prestige of various
kinds of legal work,6t federal trial judges are not likely to vary significantly

66. Court-annexed arbitration is a good example of ADR attached to the courthouse. See, e.g.,
PATRICIA A. EBENER & DONNA R. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL

PICTURE (1985).

67. See Robel, supra note 6, at 34-36 (commenting on the magistrates' role). Wolf Heydebrand and
Carroll Seron note that the
effect of judges is not the only, or even the main factor, in an explanation of terminations [of
cases]. To be sure, an Article III judge is ultimately responsible for the written order that will
expedite or terminate a particular case. But the "support staff" of modem judicial personnel plays
an important part in this process: nonjudicial personnel are interdependent with judicial personnel
the number
and in some instances directly affect decisions and outcomes. In civil dispositions
of magistrates plays an important role, especially in more "marginal" types of cases (for example,
pnsoner petitions).
WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
FEDERAL DisTICr COURTS 186 (1990).
68. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 33, at 92 (noting the "overwhelming tendency" of lawyers at
all prestige levels to "concur on the general prestige rank order of the fields" of practice).
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from appellate judges in the kinds of cases they view as prestigious. 69 We
could predict that they too will develop similar strategies for protecting the
prestige of their positions by assuring their ability to compete for prestigious
work. For instance, to the extent that the political branches are suggesting
court-connected alternatives to litigation, such as court-annexed arbitration or
mediation, or early neutral evaluation, judges may be able to control the
course of low-prestige cases by diverting them to these alternatives in order
to compete more effectively for higher-status business disputes.
We know far less, however, about the kinds of professional satisfactions
trial judges receive from their work.70 Unlike appellate judges, most trial
judges' reputations do not come from the scholarliness of their opinions.
While some judges become known for their ability to get a settlement, most
trial judges make their reputations in trials. It is difficult to imagine what trial
substitute will make for a satisfying career. Moreover, it is difficult to
imagine what we want our judges to do instead.
CONCLUSION
By focusing this discussion on privatization's effect on judges, I do not
mean to suggest that we should not be concerned with privatization's other
effects on the public court system. Particularly, I am concerned about the
question of which litigants are being sent to what type of ADR, and what type
of public courts are implicitly imagined by public policy discourse about court
alternatives. I do not think we can begin to explore these questions, however,
without imagining first how the central actors in the public courts, the judges,
will respond to conflicting pulls of professional ideology, duty, and competition for cases with private and court-annexed alternatives.

69. And, similarly, there is evidence that they have shifted front-line responsibility for low prestige
cases within the judicial bureaucracy to magistrates and pro se law clerks. See, e.g., CARROLL SERON,
THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1985); Robel, supra note
6, at 34-36.
70. The little data we have suggests that trial judges, like appellate judges, find the approval and
respect of their peers to be the most important reference groups. Nancy L. Alpert, The Judicial Career
Patterns of Socialization on the Bench 108 (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University).

